Sapiens Management Journal. 2026;3.3. 004
ISNN: 3073-1364
DOI: https://doi.org/10.71068/j3j5zq82

Article: Review

The geo-economics of BRICS+ and its rise in the global economy: a threat or a necessity for the new world order

A geoeconomia dos BRICS+ e sua ascensão na economia global: uma ameaça ou uma necessidade para a nova ordem mundial

[1]Domingos José Barbante, [2]Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, [3]Erica Islandia dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.

[1] Maravilha Polytechnic Institute, Angola
[2] Katyavala Bwila State University, Angola
[3] Katyavala Bwila State University, Angola

*Corresponding author: Domingos José Barbante

Submitted: 01-06-2026 **Revised:** 24-06-2026 **Accepted:** 28-07-2026 **Published:** 10-08-2026

Name the following:

José Barbante, D., Santos Silva, S. C. C. dos, & Fragoso Frazão, E. I. D. S. (2026). A geoeconomia dos BRICS+ e sua ascensão na economia global: uma ameaça ou uma necessidade para a nova ordem mundial. *Sapiens Management Journal*, *3*(3), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.71068/j3j5zq82

ABSTRACT

Introduction: The expansion of BRICS+ has become a relevant expression of contemporary geoeconomic change because it increases the participation of emerging economies in debates on trade, development finance, settlement currencies and global governance. Objective: This study analyzes how the geoeconomic rise of BRICS+ influences the reconfiguration of the global economic order and the position of the United States, while considering implications for African economies such as Angola. Method: A qualitative, bibliographic, documentary, descriptive and reflective review was conducted using recent academic studies and institutional documents on BRICS enlargement, economic integration, the New Development Bank, de-dollarization, strategic resources and South–South cooperation. Results: The synthesis indicates that enlargement strengthens agenda-setting capacity and institutional diversification, although national interests, productive asymmetries and coordination costs continue to constrain collective action. Evidence supports gradual diversification rather than an immediate replacement of the existing monetary and institutional architecture. Conclusions: BRICS+ should be interpreted as a heterogeneous platform that can pressure and reform global governance while building complementary mechanisms. For Angola, opportunities depend on domestic institutional capacity, project quality, technological learning and productive transformation.

Keywords: BRICS+; geoeconomics; global governance; Global South; de-dollarization; Angola.

RESUMEN

Introdução: A expansão dos BRICS+ tornou-se uma expressão relevante da mudança geoeconómica contemporânea porque amplia a participação de economias emergentes nos debates sobre comércio, financiamento do desenvolvimento, moedas de liquidação e governação global. Objetivo geral: O estudo analisa de que modo a ascensão geoeconómica dos BRICS+ influencia a reconfiguração da ordem económica mundial e a posição dos Estados Unidos, considerando também implicações para economias africanas como Angola. Metodologia: Realizou-se uma investigação qualitativa, bibliográfica, documental, descritiva e reflexiva, baseada em estudos académicos recentes e documentos institucionais sobre expansão dos BRICS,

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integração económica, New Development Bank, desdolarização, recursos estratégicos e cooperação Sul-Sul. Resultados: A síntese indica que a expansão fortalece a capacidade de agenda e a diversificação institucional, embora interesses nacionais, assimetrias produtivas e custos de coordenação continuem a limitar a ação coletiva. A evidência sustenta diversificação gradual, e não substituição imediata da arquitetura monetária e institucional vigente. Conclusões: O BRICS+ configura uma plataforma heterogénea capaz de pressionar por reformas e construir mecanismos complementares. Para Angola, as oportunidades dependem da capacidade institucional, da qualidade dos projetos, da aprendizagem tecnológica e da transformação produtiva.

Palabras clave: BRICS+; geoeconomia; governação global; Sul Global; desdolarização; Angola.

INTRODUCTION

Geoeconomics has become a central key to international relations because it allows us to understand how trade, finance, investment, technology, energy and infrastructure are mobilized simultaneously as development resources and instruments of influence. Babić, Dixon, and Liu (1) explain that contemporary geoeconomic competition combines interdependence and rivalry, so that economic networks capable of generating efficiency can also produce strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities. This formulation is particularly useful for analyzing the BRICS+, whose expansion occurs against a backdrop of economic fragmentation, trade tensions, and the search for alternative coordination mechanisms. Thus, the problem is not only to compare the size of economies, but to understand how material capacities, financial institutions, value chains, and political alliances are articulated to modify margins of autonomy and influence in the international system.

Dunford, Liu, and Pompeani (2) argue that the relative growth of emerging economies and the creation of institutions such as the New Development Bank should be interpreted as part of a gradual reconfiguration of the world order, marked by the coexistence of consolidated structures and new forms of cooperation. This perspective avoids the idea that the emergence of alternative mechanisms produces, by itself, the replacement of the Bretton Woods institutions or the US financial power. Instead, the authors help to understand the rise of the BRICS+ as a cumulative process of institutional transformation, in which new actors seek to increase representation, autonomy, and bargaining capacity. This reading also makes it possible to differentiate between contestation, reform and replacement, concepts that are often treated as equivalent, although they produce different consequences for global economic governance and for the strategies of countries in the Global South.

Cochrane and Zaidan (3) demonstrate, through economic, trade and military indicators, that the enlargement of the BRICS has changed the aggregate weight of the grouping compared to the G7, but warn that conclusions about hegemonic change cannot be built from a single indicator. The longitudinal comparison carried out by the authors shows that the relevance of BRICS+ varies according to the dimension observed, requiring a distinction between participation in the product, trade, population, energy, military power, institutional influence and monetary centrality. This distinction is essential because a grouping can expand economic participation without controlling the main financial circuits or without having sufficiently cohesive decision-making mechanisms. Consequently, the increase in aggregate weight should be interpreted as an expansion of potential resources of influence, the conversion of which into effective power depends on political coordination, institutional legitimacy, and the ability to formulate sustainable common initiatives.

https://doi.org/10.71068/j3j5zq82

Nach and Ncwadi (4) argue that economic integration among members presents relevant opportunities for trade, investment and financial cooperation, but remains conditioned by structural differences, transaction costs, different production patterns and national interests. That finding prevents the increase in the number of members from being confused with the immediate formation of an integrated market or a homogeneous economic strategy. De Carvalho, Anand and Naidu (5) reinforce this interpretation by characterizing expansion as a turning point between adaptation and attempted restructuring of global governance. For these authors, the grouping combines the search for greater representation in existing institutions with the construction of its own mechanisms. Therefore, BRICS+ should not be simplistically classified as exclusively reformist or as an integral substitute for the current order, as its performance combines strategies that vary according to the theme and interests of the participants.

Wang and Mishra (6) add that the potential power arising from expansion needs to be accompanied by legitimacy, institutional capacity, and coordination mechanisms that allow transforming diversity into collective action. According to the authors, the incorporation of new members increases resources, geographic reach, and representativeness, but also increases the complexity of negotiations and the costs of reaching common positions. For the African continent, Alden and Schoeman (7) show that South African participation must be understood in relation to the search for autonomy, institutional reform and new partnerships, without ignoring the tensions between national interests and continental representation. This observation is relevant for Angola, which is not a full member of the BRICS, but maintains important economic relations with several members and may be affected by changes in the flows of financing, investment, energy, minerals and trade associated with the growing projection of the grouping.

In the Angolan case, the analysis should avoid the assumption that a closer relationship with emerging economies automatically produces industrialization, productive diversification or economic autonomy. Pitcher and Moorman (8), when examining the Luanda-Bengo Special Economic Zone, show that ambitious industrial policy projects can present limited results when institutional design, incentives, coordination and implementation are not adequately aligned. This evidence allows the introduction of a domestic dimension that is indispensable to geoeconomic analysis: external opportunities only become structural transformation when there are internal capacities to select projects, negotiate counterparts, develop suppliers, absorb technology and ensure financial sustainability. Given this scenario, one wonders how the geoeconomic rise of the BRICS+ influences the reconfiguration of the world economic order and the hegemonic position of the United States. The overall objective is to analyze this influence, identifying opportunities, limitations and implications for global governance and for African economies such as Angola.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Geoeconomics, interdependence and strategic competition

Babić, Dixon, and Liu (1) conceive contemporary geoeconomics as a field in which interdependence ceases to be just a source of efficiency and becomes an object of strategy. In this scenario, sanctions, technological control, financing, value chains, access to markets, and infrastructure can be used to

increase bargaining power or reduce vulnerabilities. This approach shifts the analysis of BRICS+ from the simple comparison of gross domestic product to the ability to build networks, institutions and economic instruments capable of producing political effects. The relevance of the grouping, therefore, depends both on the material resources available and on the possibility of coordinating them. By applying that perspective, it becomes possible to assess more accurately why expansion can increase collective influence in certain sectors without automatically producing a uniform foreign policy or a fully alternative economic architecture.

Qian, Vreeland and Zhao (9), when examining the influence of the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank on the World Bank, show that new financial institutions can generate adaptive responses in established organizations. The contribution of this study to the analysis of the BRICS+ is methodologically important because it demonstrates that an emerging institution does not need to replace a traditional organization to change the behavior of the system. Institutional competition can modify priorities, financing conditions, project distribution and incentives of already consolidated actors. This logic helps to interpret the New Development Bank and other cooperation mechanisms as sources of competitive pressure and institutional learning. Thus, the transformation of the global order can occur by overlapping, adapting, and diversifying alternatives, and not exclusively by a sudden rupture. This possibility is central to understanding the relationship between the rise of the BRICS+, existing institutions, and the economic leadership of the United States.

Expansion of the BRICS+ and transformation of the global order

De Carvalho, Gruzd, and Wu (10) note that the enlarged BRICS sends both reformist and revisionist signals, because members advocate changes in existing governance while creating parallel mechanisms and seeking greater strategic autonomy. For the authors, this ambiguity constitutes a structural characteristic of the grouping and explains why its influence cannot be reduced to a single narrative of opposition to the West. Omoigberale (11) reaches a compatible conclusion by identifying greater capacity to challenge asymmetries of global governance, but also internal divisions, power differences and strategic interests that limit collective action. Taken together, these contributions suggest that the expansion expands resources for negotiation and representation, but increases heterogeneity. The resulting transformation therefore tends to combine institutional reform initiatives, the construction of specific alternatives, and the preservation of pragmatic relationships with traditional organizations and markets.

Konwer (12), when analyzing India's interests, shows that expansion increases diplomatic possibilities, but also intensifies dilemmas related to strategic autonomy and balance between different partners. The coexistence of close relations of the members with different poles of power demonstrates that membership of the BRICS does not eliminate national foreign policies or produce automatic alignment. Esteves and Coelho (13) observe a similar dynamic in the Brazilian case, describing the evolution of the grouping as a passage from a predominantly reformist platform to a space more marked by geopolitical competition and hedging strategies. This transformation expands the relevance of BRICS+, but makes it more difficult to preserve common objectives on sensitive issues. The literature, therefore, points to a flexible cooperation structure, in which convergences can be

strong on issues such as representation and financing for development, but more fragile when they involve security, regional rivalries or positions with great powers.

Economic integration, financing and the New Development Bank

Nach and Ncwadi (4) identify potential for commercial and financial integration among members, but emphasize obstacles derived from development asymmetries, different productive structures, logistical barriers, and institutional costs. The quantitative expansion of the group therefore needs to be distinguished from effective economic integration, which requires reduction of frictions, productive complementarity and stable cooperation mechanisms. Hooijmaaijers (14) shows that the New Development Bank constitutes a relevant case of institutionalization because it transforms political coordination into permanent financial capacity. The bank represents a concrete innovation of the grouping, although its existence does not imply abandonment of the Bretton Woods institutions. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the geoeconomic consolidation of BRICS+ depends on transforming political intentions into institutional infrastructures capable of financing projects, reducing transaction costs, and creating sufficiently distributed benefits to sustain cooperation between very different economies.

Nanwani (15) argues that the consolidation of the New Development Bank depends on strategic partnerships, the ability to mobilize resources, the quality of the projects and the articulation with other development institutions. This perspective reinforces the interpretation of the NDB as a complementary and competitive mechanism in certain niches, rather than as a universal substitute for the World Bank. De Sá and Garcia (16) demonstrate that the expansion of the BRICS creates new possibilities for convergence between the New Development Bank and the BRICS Business Council, bringing financing, investment and business priorities closer together. The authors also allow us to problematize which sectors and interests capture the benefits of this institutionalization. Caixeta, Pithan, Ferreira and Mariano (17) interpret the bank as a concrete expression of the Global South's search for greater financial autonomy, but point out that the transformation of the world order depends on converting institutional mechanisms into effective development, sustainable cooperation and productive capacity in the beneficiary countries.

Local currencies, the dollar and the limits of de-dollarization

Johnston (18) shows that BRICS debates on the dollar and the SWIFT system have evolved from general criticism to more concrete discussions about local currencies, payment systems, and monetary reform. The author, however, differentiates the increased interest in alternatives from the existence of a fully functioning common currency or an immediate replacement of the dollar. This distinction is critical to prevent political statements from being treated as evidence of a monetary change that has already been completed. De-dollarization can occur in a partial, sectoral and asymmetric way, for example through greater use of national currencies in bilateral transactions, without eliminating the function of the dollar as a reserve, unit of account and global financial asset. Thus, the debate on BRICS+ should consider degrees of monetary diversification and not just a simplified opposition between the permanence or disappearance of the U.S. currency.

https://doi.org/10.71068/j3j5zq82

Mpanda and Sebola (19) analyze de-dollarization in the BRICS+ space based on the connectivity of returns and volatility between currencies, contributing to shift the discussion from political statements to market indicators. The results show that greater financial interconnectedness needs to be interpreted with caution and does not automatically equate to a monetary union or the disappearance of dollar centrality. Lissovolik (20) adds that the expansion of the BRICS opens up new geographies and spheres of cooperation, including payments, trade and connectivity, and argues that diversification can advance by gradual mechanisms without relying on a single supranational currency. Taken together, these studies support an incremental transition interpretation, in which members seek to reduce specific vulnerabilities, expand settlement options, and strengthen financial autonomy, but continue to operate within a deeply interdependent international monetary architecture.

Strategic resources, Africa and implications for Angola

Müller (21) demonstrates that BRICS cooperation in the mineral sector is conditioned by the tension between collective geopolitical objectives and national interests. The growing relevance of critical minerals expands the negotiating capacity of several members, but does not eliminate competition for investments, processing, technology and access to markets. For resource-rich African economies, this dynamic can open up new possibilities for partnership, although it can also reproduce primary export patterns when value-adding policies do not exist. Alden and Schoeman (7) argue that the African position within the BRICS should be analyzed beyond the symbolism of representation, as the usefulness of the grouping for the continent depends on the ability to convert diplomatic forums into financing, trade, technology and development results. This condition is especially pertinent for Angola, whose international insertion remains strongly associated with natural resources and the need for productive diversification.

Govender (22), in discussing the recent literature on BRICS and African development, draws attention to the need to critically evaluate who captures the benefits of new partnerships and which domestic capacities are strengthened. This caution is pertinent for Angola, where the diversification of partners can expand financing alternatives, but it does not replace national policies of productivity, transparency, and structural transformation. Pitcher and Moorman (8) show, in the case of the Luanda-Bengo Special Economic Zone, that ambitious industrial policies can fail when the implementation logic does not create adequate incentives for productive learning and business development. Therefore, Angola's approach to trade and financing networks associated with BRICS+ must be accompanied by strict criteria for project selection, local linkages, technology transfer and debt sustainability. The geoeconomic opportunity is real, but its outcome depends on domestic institutions capable of negotiating and implementing coherent strategies.

METHOD

The study adopted a bibliographic and documental design, descriptive and reflective, with a qualitative approach, suitable for a research question oriented to interpret geoeconomic and institutional trends instead of estimating causal relationships. The unit of analysis was made up of academic studies and institutional documents related to geoeconomics, BRICS/BRICS+ expansion,

economic integration, development finance, settlement currencies, global governance, strategic resources and cooperation with Africa. The documentary design was chosen because the object involves recent processes, distributed among scientific literature, institutional analyses and comparative evidence that cannot be reduced to a single statistical basis. The reflective character does not mean the absence of criteria: the interpretation was conducted in a thematic way, seeking to explain convergences, divergences, limits and implications of the sources selected for the central question of the article.

The bibliographic update focused on works published between 2021 and 2026, with priority given to recent articles in academic journals of international circulation and studies directly related to the expansion of the BRICS, the New Development Bank, de-dollarization, global governance, and the African position. Institutional documents were kept only when necessary to confirm composition, official statements or indicators whose nature does not correspond to the results of scientific articles. The selection strategy considered four cumulative criteria: direct relationship with the research question; verifiable authorship and provenance; availability of DOI or persistent URL; and enough timeliness to represent the contemporary phase of the grouping. Studies prior to the recent study were used only when they offered specific evidence that could not be replaced by subsequent publication, as is the case with the analysis by Pitcher and Moorman (8) on the Luanda-Bengo Special Economic Zone and the capacity to implement the Angolan industrial policy.

The analytical process was organized into four categories defined based on the objective of the study: economic and institutional weight; commercial and financial diversification; global governance reform and implications for the position of the United States; and internal limitations, asymmetries and opportunities for African economies. In each category, the sources were read comparatively to identify the main argument, the nature of the evidence presented, the convergences with other studies, and the limitations to generalization. The synthesis was not treated as a meta-analysis, because the studies have heterogeneous designs, indicators and objects. Statistical tests or estimation of effects were also not performed. The procedure adopted corresponded to an interpretative thematic synthesis, in which results from secondary sources were reorganized according to common analytical problems, preserving the distinction between evidence reported by the authors consulted and inferences formulated in this article.

To increase argumentative traceability, the citations were normalized according to the Vancouver system, with numbering assigned according to the first occurrence of each source in the text and reuse of the same number in subsequent mentions. This procedure allows each relevant statement to be related to the corresponding reference in a direct and consistent way, preserving the identification of the authors when necessary for argumentative fluidity. In the results section, the citations were kept whenever the text synthesizes findings from the corpus, because, in a documentary study, these findings constitute the empirical material of the analysis itself. On the other hand, operations performed by the authors of this article, such as the definition of categories, the organization of tables and the formulation of comparative inferences, are presented as proper procedures. For Angola, additional caution was adopted: the country is discussed as a case of

geoeconomic implication and not as a full member of BRICS+, avoiding extrapolating evidence that sources do not directly support.

RESULTS

The documentary analysis produced four interpretative axes that allow answering the research question without reducing the rise of the BRICS+ to a simple comparison of economic size. In the first axis, related to the economic and institutional weight, Cochrane and Zaidan (3) show that the expansion substantially modifies some aggregate indicators of the cluster in comparison with the G7, although the magnitude and meaning of this change depend on the indicator selected. De Carvalho, Gruzd, and Wu (10) add that greater aggregate weight increases agenda capacity and diplomatic visibility, but does not resolve the central issue of coordination among members. The interpretative result is that expansion increases potential resources of influence, but its conversion into geoeconomic power depends on institutions, legitimacy and the ability to formulate common positions in areas where national interests do not always coincide.

In the second axis, referring to commercial and financial diversification, Nach and Ncwadi (4) identify opportunities for integration, but show that structural barriers and productive asymmetries remain relevant. Hooijmaaijers (14) shows that the New Development Bank represents a concrete institutionalisation of financial cooperation, because it provides the grouping with a permanent structure for mobilising resources and financing development. Nanwani (15) stresses, however, that the bank's future capacity depends on strategic partnerships, access to financing and the quality of its institutional articulation. The synthesis of these results indicates that BRICS+ expands the plurality of instruments available to members and partners, but does not yet configure a separate financial system. The most plausible effect is the increase in options and negotiating capacity, especially in areas of infrastructure and development, accompanied by competition and complementarity with traditional multilateral institutions.

In the third axis, related to monetary governance and payment systems, Johnston (18) identifies growing interest of the BRICS in settlement mechanisms and the use of local currencies, but does not interpret this process as proof of the immediate replacement of the dollar. Mpanda and Sebola (19) reinforce the need to assess de-dollarization through market indicators, avoiding inferring a monetary transformation completed only from political statements. Lissovolik (20) shows that diversification can proceed through gradual mechanisms and multiple platforms, without requiring the immediate creation of a supranational currency. The result of the synthesis is, therefore, more compatible with a strategy of reducing vulnerabilities and expanding payment alternatives than with a monetary rupture. This distinction is central to a balanced assessment of the effects of BRICS+ on the financial position of the United States.

In the fourth axis, internal limitations appear recurrently and prevent the grouping from being interpreted as a unitary actor. Wang and Mishra (6) show that expansion simultaneously increases potential power, representativeness, and decision-making complexity. Omoigberale (11) concludes that asymmetries and national interests condition the capacity for transformation, while Konwer (12) shows that important members preserve their own strategies of autonomy and balance. For Africa,

Alden and Schoeman (7) highlight that greater representation only produces gains when it is converted into institutional and economic results. Applied to Angola, this conclusion suggests that opportunities for financing, trade and cooperation should not be confused with automatic benefits. The country can expand the diversity of partners, but capturing gains depends on negotiating capacity, investment criteria, technological learning, and domestic policies that transform foreign resources into productivity and added value.

Table 1.

Synthesis of results by analytical axis

Analytical axis	Synthesized evidence	Interpretation of the study
Economic and institutional weight	Cochrane and Zaidan (3) show an increase in aggregate weight in several dimensions. De Carvalho, Gruzd and Wu (10) show greater capacity for agenda accompanied by coordination challenges.	Expansion increases potential resources of influence, but does not produce automatic political cohesion.
Integration and financing	Nach and Ncwadi (4) identify opportunities and barriers to integration. Hooijmaaijers (14) and Nanwani (15) show the institutionalization and operational limits of the NDB.	The NDB expands financing alternatives and can complement or compete with traditional institutions in specific areas.
Currencies and payments	Johnston (18) documents increased attention to local currencies and payments. Mpanda and Sebola (19) show the need to evaluate the process with market indicators.	The evidence supports gradual monetary diversification, not a completed de-dollarization.
Limitations and Africa	Wang and Mishra (6) highlight coordination costs. Alden and Schoeman (7) show that African representation needs to be converted into concrete results.	The impact for Africa depends on institutional quality and productive transformation in partner countries.

Note. Elaboration of the authors from the thematic synthesis of the corpus. The table does not represent frequency count, statistical estimation, or meta-analysis.

The synthesis also made it possible to distinguish opportunities from geoeconomic risks, avoiding treating any BRICS+ instrument as an intrinsic benefit. De Sá and Garcia (16) show that expansion can expand connections between financing and business activity, creating possibilities for investment and articulation between institutions in the group. Müller (21) shows that strategic resources can strengthen the negotiating position of certain members, but also intensify competition for processing, technology and markets. Esteves and Coelho (13) show that national interests continue to limit the

construction of a single strategy, even when there is convergence on greater representation of the Global South. For Angola, the analytical result is twofold: the diversification of partners can reduce specific dependencies and expand financing options, but the benefits depend on contracts, financial sustainability, local content, knowledge transfer and public capacity to monitor the implementation of projects.

Table 2.

Geoeconomic opportunities and limitations identified in the desk analysis

Dimension	Opportunities identified	Limitations and cautions
Trade and investment	Diversification of markets, chains, investors and economic partners.	Production asymmetries, integration costs and concentration on primary products.
Funding	Greater plurality of development sources, instruments and institutions.	Financial capacity, selection criteria, quality of projects and debt sustainability.
Monetary system	Increased use of local currencies and innovation in payment mechanisms.	Absence of evidence of rapid and uniform dollar replacement.
Global governance	Greater representation from the Global South and pressure for institutional reforms.	Difficult consensus between members with different priorities and external relations.
Angola and Africa	Possibilities for financing, industrialization, infrastructure, minerals and trade.	Risk of dependency, low local added value and fragility of institutional implementation.

Note. Elaborated by the authors. The line relating to Angola constitutes an analytical inference supported by the African literature and the study of Pitcher and Moorman (8); Angola is not presented as a full member of BRICS+.

DISCUSSION

The results support a nuanced interpretation of the rise of the BRICS+, in which the expansion of resources and representation does not automatically equate to the replacement of the existing order. De Carvalho, Anand and Naidu (5) describe expansion as a combination of adaptation and attempted restructuring, while Omoigberale (11) identifies a similar tension between transformation and incremental change. The convergence between these studies indicates that the cluster exerts pressure on established institutions and practices, but does not yet demonstrate the capacity to fully replace them. This conclusion answers the question of the article by suggesting that the main current geoeconomic effect is not the formation of a fully consolidated alternative hegemony, but the expansion of the space for negotiation and institutional competition. The position of the United States therefore faces greater contestation and diversification of alternatives, although it continues to be

supported by monetary, financial, technological, and institutional advantages that do not disappear with the expansion of BRICS+.

The empirical evidence from Cochrane and Zaidan (3) reinforces this caution because it shows that comparisons between BRICS+ and G7 vary according to the indicator selected. Aggregate percentages of population, product, energy, or trade should be interpreted as specific measures and not as direct equivalents of hegemony. The discussion becomes more rigorous when it is recognized that economic power involves financing capacity, depth of markets, innovation, control of critical infrastructures, regulatory influence and monetary confidence. Therefore, the expansion can significantly increase the weight of BRICS+ in resources, production, and markets without eliminating institutional or financial asymmetries. The relevance of the grouping lies precisely in expanding the possibilities of coordination between economies that previously had less capacity for a collective agenda. However, transforming economic mass into lasting influence requires decision-making mechanisms, compliance with commitments and production of public goods capable of sustaining trust between members and partners.

In the financial domain, Hooijmaaijers (14) allows us to understand the New Development Bank as a relevant institutional advance because it transforms diplomatic coordination into a permanent organization. Nanwani (15), however, shows that the bank's reach depends on partnerships, funding capacity, governance and strategic choices. De Sá and Garcia (16) add that expansion can deepen the link between business priorities and financing, expanding opportunities, but also requiring attention to the distribution of benefits and the favored sectors. This combination of institutionalization and operational boundaries suggests that the NDB is better interpreted as part of a plural financial architecture than as an immediate replacement for traditional institutions. For African countries, plurality can improve bargaining power and access to resources, but the quality of impact depends on the conditions of the projects, debt sustainability, and the ability to generate domestic productive chains rather than just financing infrastructure disconnected from structural transformation.

Regarding de-dollarization, Johnston (18) shows that the BRICS monetary agenda has become more concrete, especially in payments and local currencies, while Mpanda and Sebola (19) add market evidence to assess monetary connectivity in the BRICS+ area. Taken together, these studies do not justify affirming that the hegemony of the dollar has been replaced; sustain, with greater certainty, the existence of efforts to diversify and reduce specific vulnerabilities. This difference has important analytical implications, because adopting national currencies in selected transactions can reduce costs or exposure to sanctions without creating a reserve currency capable of competing globally on liquidity, financial depth, and trust. The discussion of threat or necessity for the new world order must thus avoid absolute formulations. BRICS+ may constitute a need for greater institutional plurality for its members and partners, while representing a competitive challenge for specific areas of U.S. influence.

The political dimension also limits deterministic readings. Wang and Mishra (6) argue that expansion increases potential power and, at the same time, coordination costs, because new members introduce different priorities, alliances, and risk perceptions. Konwer (12) demonstrates this dilemma

from India, while Esteves and Coelho (13) show that Brazil uses the BRICS in an increasingly competitive multipolarity environment and seeks to preserve autonomy. These results indicate that the grouping should be analysed as a heterogeneous forum for coordination and not as a unitary actor comparable to a State. Its strength may lie precisely in its flexibility, which allows for selective cooperation without requiring complete alignment; However, this same flexibility reduces the ability to respond uniformly to crises or controversies. The geoeconomic future of BRICS+ will therefore depend on balancing diversity and institutionalization without turning consensus into an impossible requirement for all areas of cooperation.

For Africa, Alden and Schoeman (7) show that the South African presence offers a platform for representation, but does not guarantee that continental priorities are automatically incorporated into the grouping's decisions. Govender (22) reinforces the need to critically evaluate the relationship between BRICS and African development, especially the distribution of benefits, the sustainability of partnerships, and the capacity to promote productive transformation. This discussion is directly relevant to Angola because the country can benefit from a greater plurality of partners without eliminating challenges of state capacity, dependence on resources and economic diversification. Participation in trade and financial networks associated with BRICS+ can expand options, but it does not replace a national strategy. For geoeconomic change to produce lasting benefits, Angola needs to link financing and investment to local content objectives, training, productive infrastructure, innovation, and the development of national companies capable of integrating regional and international value chains.

The study by Pitcher and Moorman (8) offers a particularly important caveat for the Angolan interpretation, because the analysis of the Luanda–Bengo Special Economic Zone shows that financial resources and industrial ambition are not sufficient when institutional architecture, incentives and implementation are flawed. This evidence allows us to qualify the enthusiasm that can accompany new sources of financing or investment from emerging economies. A possible intensification of Angola's relations with countries and institutions associated with the BRICS+ should be evaluated by the quality of the projects, technology transfer, local chains, contractual transparency and financial sustainability. The main limitation of this article stems from its bibliographical, documentary, and reflective character: the synthesis does not estimate causal effects or quantitatively measure the impact of expansion on the dollar, trade, or U.S. hegemony. In addition, the availability of recent studies specifically dedicated to the Angola-BRICS+ relationship remains limited, which is why the Angolan case is treated as an analytical implication and not as an independent empirical result.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis concludes that the geoeconomic rise of the BRICS+ contributes to a more plural international order by expanding the representation of emerging economies, diversifying financial instruments, and increasing pressure for reforms in global governance. Recent literature, however, does not support the interpretation of an immediate and linear replacement of the economic architecture led by the United States. The most consistent result is the coexistence between reform, competition and the construction of specific alternatives. The New Development Bank, the increasing

use of local currencies and the mechanisms of economic cooperation demonstrate institutional capacity, but they remain part of an international system characterized by strong interdependence. Thus, BRICS+ represents both a challenge to the concentration of power in certain institutions and a response to the Global South's demand for greater choice, without constituting a completely separate or self-sufficient economic order so far.

The expansion also magnifies the internal contradictions of the group. Differences in economic scale, diplomatic priorities, development models, and external relations make consensus more complex, although they do not prevent selective cooperation in areas of common interest. Therefore, BRICS+ should be understood as a flexible and heterogeneous platform, whose influence depends both on the resources of the members and on the ability to produce legitimate institutions, functional mechanisms and concrete results. For Angola, the main implication is the possibility of expanding financing, trade, infrastructure and industrial cooperation options with economies in the Global South. This opportunity only tends to generate structural transformation when accompanied by institutional capacity, rigorous project evaluation, technological learning, transparency, and policies that increase domestic added value. The diversification of partners should be treated as an instrument of national strategy, and not as a substitute for the development strategy itself.

Future research could deepen this analysis through systematic reviews specifically dedicated to the BRICS and Lusophone Africa, as well as compare Angola's trade, investment, and financing flows with different members of the grouping. Quantitative studies could examine whether the diversification of partners changes the productive structure, financial exposure, composition of exports and the economic autonomy of the country. It would also be relevant to investigate concrete projects funded or executed by institutions and companies associated with BRICS+ members, evaluating local content, technology transfer, employment, and fiscal sustainability. This advance would make it possible to overcome a central limitation of the current literature, which is still concentrated on aggregate analyses of the cluster or on studies on its most influential members. For Angola, specific empirical evidence would help distinguish effective opportunities from policy expectations and formulate more precise economic policy recommendations.

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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As this is a bibliographic and documentary study, based exclusively on academic publications and institutional documents of public access, there was no participation of human beings or collection of personal data. For this reason, no informed consent or ethical approval procedures were applied. The study respected the principles of academic integrity, proper attribution of sources and fidelity in the interpretation of the literature analyzed.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) USAGE STATEMENT

The authors declare that generative artificial intelligence tools were used exclusively to support linguistic review and editorial organization of the manuscript. The study design, the selection of sources, the analysis, the interpretation of the results and the conclusions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

FUNDING:

The authors state that this research has not received specific funding from public agencies, private institutions, commercial organizations, or non-profit entities.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST:

The authors declare that there are no financial, personal, professional or institutional conflicts of interest related to the conduction, analysis or publication of this study.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION

Conceptualization: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Data curation: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Formal analysis: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Research: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Methodology: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Project management: Domingos José Barbante.Supervision: Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Validation: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Writing – original version: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.
Writing – proofreading and editing: Domingos José Barbante, Sónia Cristina Cardoso dos Santos Silva, Erica Iceland Dos Santos Fragoso Frazão.